


U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties



Homeland
Security

June 2012

Countering Violent Extremism




- Empower Communities
- Share threat information
- Strengthen cooperation with law enforcement
- Help communities protect themselves
 - Grassroots Narratives
 - Limit recruits



Homeland
Security

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY



* Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis title created by Public Law 110-53, Aug. 3rd, 2007

Approved 3/20/2008



Homeland Security

DHS- Countering Violent Extremism

1. Better understand the behaviors and indicators of violent extremism
 - Analysis (I&A, Policy)
 - Research (S&T)
2. Support law enforcement and community oriented policing efforts
 - Training (CT Coordinator, FLETC, CRCL)
 - Grant Prioritization (FEMA)
3. Enhance partnerships with communities and law enforcement
 - Community Engagement (CRCL, HSAC)



**Homeland
Security**

DHS Mission

To “ensure that civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.”

6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(G)

Our Mission

The Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) supports the Department’s mission to secure the Nation while preserving individual liberty, fairness, and equality under the law.

6 U.S.C. § 345; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1



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We assist DHS colleagues through:

- I. **Proactive Advice:** We help the Department to shape policy in ways that are mindful of civil rights and civil liberties by providing proactive advice, evaluation and review of a wide range of technical, legal and policy issues.
- II. **Public Complaint Resolution:** We investigate and resolve complaints filed by the public regarding Departmental policies or actions taken by Departmental personnel.
- III. **EEO Leadership:** We provide leadership to the Department's equal employment opportunity programs, seeking to make this Department the model federal agency.
- IV. **Engaging with the Public: Developing community oriented solutions to homeland security issues.**




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We assist DHS colleagues through:

4. Engaging with the Public:

We communicate with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by Department activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the Department to their experiences and concerns.



Why Civil Rights Community Engagement?

Public engagement with diverse communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by government activities is a priority.

Our Community Engagement Section responds to community concerns and provides information on DHS programs, activities, and issues by building trust and establishing a routine process for communication and coordination with diverse community leaders and organizations.



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
Community Engagement Goals

- Communicate and share reliable information about Federal programs and policies, including avenues for redress and complaints;
- Obtain information and feedback about community concerns and on-the-ground impacts of DHS activities;
- Incorporate community ideas and issues relating to civil rights and civil liberties into the policymaking process;
- Deepen channels of communication between communities, regional DHS leadership and other federal officials in order to facilitate solution of problems



Community Engagement Mechanisms

2012 Map of DHS CRCL Community Engagement Section Roundtables



Key

- A - Coordinated with US Attorney's Office
- B - Coordinated with the FBI
- C - Coordinated with USCIS
- D - Coordinated with USDOJ Civil Rights Division



Homeland
Security



CRCL

Office for Civil Rights
& Civil Liberties

ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE

January 13, 2011

Los Angeles Field Office

Enforcement and Removal
Operations



Homeland Security

Subject-specific Community Events



Homeland
Security

Faith Community Engagement



Homeland
Security

Community Policing/ Training

Community Engagement Roundtable Discussion EVALUATION FORM

Sikh Americans and the Kirpan

Sikhism and the Kirpan



Sikhism is a religion that originated in South Asia during the 15th Century and is distinct from both Hinduism and Islam. The Kirpan, a religious sword, is a Sikh article of faith (see photos A-C).



The Kirpan typically has a wooden or steel handle with a blade that may be blunt. Since there is no prescribed length for the blade, the size of the Kirpan varies by personal choice. A small Kirpan, resembling or appearing like a knife, has a blade that is commonly 3-6 inches in length, though some Sikhs prefer a Kirpan with a larger blade, while others will wear a smaller blade of 2 inches or less.



The Kirpan is often worn by Sikhs of both genders underneath their clothing with a shoulder sash called a Gatra (see photo D); however, some Sikhs wear the Kirpan over their clothing in public view (see photo E) or around their neck (see photo F).




Inspections

Points to consider when searching a Sikh:

Do not inspect or pat down a Sikh during inspections.	Respectfully ask if a Sikh is carrying a Kirpan. If an inspect is required to inspect the Kirpan.	Searches should be conducted as discreetly as possible.	If the Kirpan must be conducted, explain the reasons why and handle the Kirpan with respect and care.	Review policies and procedures for more information regarding the Kirpan.
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Title 18 U.S.C. Section 930 generally prohibits the possession of knives, including Kirpans, with blades longer than 2.5 inches, in federal facilities, unless otherwise authorized. Please refer to post orders, standard operating procedures or an FPS representative for further guidance.

Federal Protective Service



Provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity and the Federal Protective Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2008. Revisions provided by Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF).

Common Muslim American Head Coverings



Members of the Islamic faith are called Muslims. Some Muslim women cover their heads based on religious belief and the Islamic requirement to be modestly. They may wear a full head covering called a hijab or a scarf over their hair. The scarf may be plain or decorated. Some Muslim men wear a skullcap called a kufi based on religious tradition.

Points to keep in mind when searching someone wearing a Muslim head covering:

Show RESPECT

Explain why you need to conduct search.

Offer private room for search if available.

Searches should be conducted by a screener of the same gender as the passenger being searched.



Provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Revisions provided by the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, IAWA. Based on original descriptions of Muslim head coverings provided by the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AAADC).



Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties



Instruction to Arab American and Muslim American Cultures Course for DHS Personnel



Homeland Security

Countering Violent Extremism



- Enhanced Engagement
- Dialogue 2.0
- Tabletop Exercises



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Foreign Fighters



Johnson said U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence officials know individuals from North America and Europe are heading to war-torn Syria, adding that “they will encounter radical, extremist influences” and possibly return to their home countries with the intent to do harm. “Syria has become a matter of homeland security,” Johnson said.



"In some ways, it's more frightening than anything I think I've seen as attorney general," he said. "This is a situation that we can see developing and the potential that I see coming up, the negative potential I see coming out of the facts in Syria and Iraq now, are quite concerning," he said.



**Homeland
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CVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS



U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Minnesota Area Community Engagement

U.S. - Denmark Community Engagement Exchange Program



Wednesday 20, August

Arrive At Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport (MSP). Travel from the Airport to the Hotel, Wyndham Garden Grand, 601 First Avenue North, Minneapolis, MN 55403.

Minneapolis-Saint Paul is the most populated urban area in the U.S. state of Minnesota, and is composed of 182 cities and townships⁽¹⁾ built around the Mississippi, Minnesota and St. Croix rivers. The area is also nicknamed the Twin Cities for its two largest cities, Minneapolis, with the highest population, and Saint Paul, the state capital. It is a classic example of twin cities in the sense of geographical proximity.

The area is part of a larger U.S. Census division named Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI. It is the country's 15th-largest metropolitan area composed of 11 counties in Minnesota and two counties in Wisconsin with a population of 3,422,264 as of the 2010 Census.⁽²⁾ This larger area in turn is enveloped in the U.S. Census combined statistical area called Minneapolis-St. Paul-St. Cloud, MN-WI with a population of 3,759,978 people as of the 2010 Census, ranked the 11th most populous in the U.S.

As a reminder that there were actually two cities, people started using the phrase Dual Cities around 1872, which evolved into Twin Cities.⁽³⁾ It is also common for those in out-state Minnesota or western Wisconsin to shorten the reference to simply The Cities. Despite the Twin moniker, the two cities are independent municipalities with defined borders and are quite distinct from each other. Minneapolis is somewhat younger with modern skyscrapers. Saint Paul has been likened to a European city with quaint neighborhoods and a vast collection of well-preserved late-Victorian architecture.

It is worth noting the differing cultural backgrounds of the two cities. Minneapolis was influenced by its early Scandinavian and Lutheran heritage and hosts the largest Somali population in North America. St. Paul was influenced by its early French, Irish and German Catholic roots and currently hosts a thriving Hmong population.



Homeland
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June 2012

Responding to the Challenge:

How do we build safe and resilient communities?



Home
Security

Changing the Narrative

CHICAGO



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
Homeland
Security

Changing the Narrative



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
June 2012

Changing the Narrative



Homeland
Security

Changing the Narrative



The poster features a black and white photograph of a woman wearing a patterned headscarf and a man in a dark jacket. The text is overlaid on the image.

Exhibition
BROKEN DREAMS
A Documentary film by Fathia Abou

After twenty years of civil war,
the tragedies followed them to their new home!
Saturday Feb 12, 2011 At 7:PM
South Minneapolis High School

Suggestion Donation \$ 15

South Minneapolis High School
3131 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55407
Info call: (612) 644-0711
(612) 481-4600

Produced by Fathia Abou - "Broken Dreams"
Directed by Fathia Abou
01.28.2011



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Life-Cycle of a Violent Extremist

MPAC HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE
ON 'SAFE SPACES INITIATIVE'
AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Watch the video



**Homeland
Security**

June 2012

Syria Foreign Fighters

THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY
OF RADICALISATION AND
POLITICAL VIOLENCE



#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks



Homeland
Security

June 2012

American Political Science Review

Page 1 of 15 February 2013

doi:10.1017/000368013000615

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting

THOMAS HEGGHAMMER *Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)*

This article studies variation in conflict theater choice by Western jihadists in an effort to understand their motivations. Some militants attack at home, whereas others join insurgencies abroad, but few scholars have asked why they make these different choices. Using open-source data, I estimate recruit survival for each theater, foreign fighter return rates, and returnee impact on domestic terrorist activity. The tentative data indicate that jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority attacks at home after being radicalized, most often through foreign fighting or contact with a veteran. Most foreign fighters do not return for domestic operations, but those who do return are more effective operatives than nonreturners. The findings have implications for our understanding of the motivations of jihadists, for assessments of the terrorist threat posed by foreign fighters, and for counterterrorism policy.

Why do some Western jihadists attack at home while others join insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and Somalia?¹ In this article, I explore this variation empirically to shed light on the motivations of radical Islamists. Many assume that jihadists all want to attack the West and that those who leave do so for training. I argue the opposite, namely, that most Western jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority attacks at home after being radicalized, most often through foreign fighting or contact with a veteran. My tentative data indicate that militants usually do not leave intending to return for a domestic attack, but a small minority acquires that motivation along the way and become more effective operatives on their return. This has implications for counterterrorism, especially for the handling of foreign fighters.

This article addresses both a social science puzzle and a policy problem. The puzzle is the unexplained variation in choice of attack location. If jihadists have similar aims, why the different travel patterns? The policy problem is that of assessing the domestic terrorist threat posed by those who leave. Put bluntly, should foreign fighters be treated as lethal terrorists-in-the-making or as harmless freedom fighters? In the past, counterterrorism have vacillated between lenience (pre-9/11) and harshness (post-9/11), depending on prevailing assumptions about what foreign fighters "really" want. Underestimating the threat is dangerous

and overestimation expensive, so policy makers need assessments grounded in facts.

This article seeks to provide an empirical base from which to begin answering such questions. Using a variety of open-source data, I generate tentative estimates of the number of domestic and foreign fighters, the proportion of foreign fighters who return, and their impact on attack effectiveness. I also offer an explanation for the overall relative distribution.

The analysis focuses strictly on variation in theater choice by radicalized Islamists. Excluded is the question of pre-choice radicalization (why they radicalized) or post-choice tactics (how they fight). More important, I do not purport to explain individual differential choice because I lack biographical data on the foreign fighters. I only seek to account for the overall relative distribution, a task similar to that of the analyst who tries to understand an election outcome without having demographic data on all the voters. However, at the end I tentatively probe the question of who stays and who goes. Empirically, the inquiry focuses on jihadists in North America, Western Europe, and Australia between 1990 and 2010.

I employ at one terminology in which a "domestic fighter" is a person who perpetrates or tries to perpetrate violence in the West, whereas a "foreign fighter" is someone who leaves or tries to leave the West to fight somewhere else. "Domestic" here means "anywhere in the West," so a French jihadist attacking in Germany counts as a domestic fighter. "Foreign fighting" includes any military activity (training or fighting), using any tactic (terrorist or guerrilla tactics), against any enemy (Western or non-Western)—so long as it occurs outside the West. Co-ethnic war volunteers (e.g., American-Iraqis going to Iraq) are counted as foreign fighters.²

From here, the analysis proceeds in seven parts. The first reviews the literature. The next two explain how I generated estimates of domestic and foreign fighters. The fourth section describes the relative distribution,

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I thank Scott Glass, the APRS editor, and the anonymous reviewers for very useful comments on early drafts of the article. I also received helpful comments and advice from Kristin Bakke, Jeff Calton, Lynn Eiken, Rasmus Greenberg, David Laitin, Bryjar Lia, Yassin Makhadmeh, Vign Narayan, Folarin Osose, and Trond Tjønnheim. I generated early versions of the article at University College London, the University of Aberdeen, and Stanford University; I thank all the participants in those seminars for helping improve the article. I am grateful to Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation for the Zuckerman Fellowship that allowed me to complete the article.

1 I define Islamism as "a doctrine justified with primary reference to Islam" and jihadists as "violent Islamists." I use "jihadist," "violent Islamist," and "militant Islamist" interchangeably.

2 I knowingly depart from existing definitions of "foreign fighter" (Hegghammer 2011; Mair 2006; Mendelsohn 2011), which often specify that foreign fighters engage in insurgencies (not terrorism) and that they lack kinship ties to the insurgents they join.

Myth

vs

Reality

Action & Adventure

Harsh Environment. Western fighters used to better living conditions

Embraced by the people

Syrian people don't want foreigners' help

Making a Difference

Used for undesirable tasks: suicide bombing, mechanical repair, cleaning

Defeating al-Assad

Not fighting al-Assad, rather fighting and targeting other Muslims/minorities

One Global Community

There is much in-fighting among terrorist groups



Department of
**Homeland
Security**

Changing the Narrative



Faith Community Working Group



Final Reminder for FCWG Upcoming Event:

UNDERSTANDING THE ISIS THREAT TO THE HOMELAND: ONLY FEW SEATS LEFT
Wed. Oct. 8

In the past year, over 100 Americans have attempted to join ISIS and other terror groups in Syria or Iraq. What does it mean for us here in Montgomery County? Our international expert panel will discuss the recruiting tactics of ISIS and other terrorist groups and explore innovative strategies for empowering the community to intervene.



SPEAKERS

- Chief Thomas Manger
[Montgomery County Police Department](#)
- Rabia Chaudry
[Founder of Safe Nation Collaborative](#)
- Mehreen Farooq
[World Organization for Resource Development and Education \[WORDE\]](#)
- Hussein Hamdani Esq & Angus Smith
[Canadian Cross Cultural Roundtable](#)



Condemning ISIS



Homeland
Security

Condemning ISIS

Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi

English (with signatories) | العربية (مع التوقيعات)

New Signatories | التوقيعات الجديدة

Click to Download: English Letter (with signatories)

Executive Summary

- 1- It is forbidden in Islam to issue *fatwas* without all the necessary learning requirements. Even then *fatwas* must follow Islamic legal theory as defined in the Classical texts. It is also forbidden to cite a portion of a verse from the Qur'an—or part of a verse—to derive a ruling without looking at everything that the Qur'an and *Hadith* teach related to that matter. In other words, there are strict subjective and objective prerequisites for *fatwas*, and one cannot ' cherry-pick' Qur'anic verses for legal arguments without considering the entire Qur'an and *Hadith*.
- 2- It is forbidden in Islam to issue legal rulings about anything without mastery of the Arabic language.
- 3- It is forbidden in Islam to oversimplify *Shari'ah* matters and ignore established Islamic sciences.
- 4- It is permissible in Islam [for scholars] to differ on any matter, except those fundamentals of religion that all Muslims must know.
- 5- It is forbidden in Islam to ignore the reality of contemporary times when deriving legal rulings.
- 6- It is forbidden in Islam to kill the innocent.
- 7- It is forbidden in Islam to kill emissaries, ambassadors, and diplomats; hence it is forbidden to kill journalists and aid workers.
- 8- *Jihad* in Islam is defensive war. It is not permissible without the right cause, the right purpose and without the right rules of conduct.
- 9- It is forbidden in Islam to declare people non-Muslim unless he (or she) openly declares disbelief.
- 10- It is forbidden in Islam to harm or mistreat—in any way—Christians or any 'People of the Scripture'.
- 11- It is obligatory to consider Yazidis as People of the Scripture.
- 12- The re-introduction of slavery is forbidden in Islam. It was abolished by universal consensus.
- 13- It is forbidden in Islam to force people to convert.
- 14- It is forbidden in Islam to deny women their rights.
- 15- It is forbidden in Islam to deny children their rights.
- 16- It is forbidden in Islam to enact legal punishments (*hudud*) without following the correct procedures that ensure justice and mercy.
- 17- It is forbidden in Islam to torture people.
- 18- It is forbidden in Islam to disgrace the dead.
- 19- It is forbidden in Islam to attribute evil acts to God ﷻ.
- 20- It is forbidden in Islam to destroy the graves and shrines of Prophets and Companions.
- 21- Armed insurrection is forbidden in Islam for any reason other than clear disbelief by the ruler and not allowing people to pray.
- 22- It is forbidden in Islam to declare a caliphate without consensus from all Muslims.
- 23- Loyalty to one's nation is permissible in Islam.
- 24- After the death of the Prophet ﷺ, Islam does not require anyone to emigrate anywhere.

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds,
Peace and Blessings be upon the Seal of the Prophets and Messengers

By the declining day, Lo! man is a state of loss. Save those who believe and do good works, and exhort one another to truth and exhort one another to endurance. (Al-'Asr, 103: 1-3)

Open Letter

To Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, alias 'Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi',

To the fighters and followers of the self-declared 'Islamic State',

Peace and the mercy of God be upon you.

During your sermon dated 6th of Ramadan 1435 AH (4th July 2014 CE), you said, paraphrasing Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq رضي الله عنه: 'If you find what I say and do to be true, then assist me, and if you find what I say and do to be false, then advise me and set me straight.' In what follows is a scholarly opinion via the media. The Prophet ﷺ said: '*Religion is [rectifying] advice!*' Everything said here below relies completely upon the statements and actions of followers of the 'Islamic State' as they themselves have promulgated in social media—or upon Muslim eyewitness accounts—and not upon other media. Every effort has been made to avoid fabrications and misunderstandings. Moreover, everything said here consists of synopses written in a simple style that reflect the opinions of the overwhelming majority of Sunni scholars over the course of Islamic history.

In one of his speeches¹, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani said: 'God bless Prophet Muhammad who was sent with the sword as a mercy to all worlds.'² This statement comprises compounded confusions and a mistaken paradigm. Yet it is often repeated by followers of the 'Islamic State'. Now God sent the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ as a mercy to all worlds: '*We did not send you, except as a mercy to all the worlds.*' (Al-Anbiya', 22: 107). This is true for all time and place. The Prophet ﷺ was sent as mercy to people, animals, plants, to the heavens and to subtle beings—no Muslims disagree about this. It is a general and unconditional statement taken from the Qur'an itself. However, the phrase, 'sent with the sword' is part of a *Hadith* that is specific to a certain time and place which have since expired. Thus it is forbidden to mix the Qur'an and *Hadith* in this way, as it is forbidden to mix the general and specific, and the conditional and unconditional.

Moreover, God has prescribed mercy upon Himself: '*... Your Lord has prescribed for Himself mercy ...*' (Al-An'am, 6:54). God also states that His mercy encompasses all things: '*... My mercy embraces all things ...*' (Al-A'raf, 7:156). In an authentic *Hadith*, the Prophet ﷺ said: '*When God created Creation, He wrote in place above His throne, with Himself "Truly, My mercy is greater than My wrath!"*'³ Accordingly, it is forbidden to equate 'the sword'—and thus wrath and severity—with 'mercy'. Furthermore, it is forbidden to make the idea 'mercy to all worlds' subordinate to the phrase 'sent with the sword', because this would mean that mercy is dependent upon the sword, which is simply not true. Besides, how could 'a sword' affect realms where swords

¹ Narrated by Muslim in *Kitab al-Iman*, no. 55.

² Published by SawarimMedia on YouTube on April 3rd, 2014.

³ Ibn Taymiyyah says in *Majmu' Al-Fatawa* (Vol. 28, p. 270), 'The Prophet ﷺ said, "I was sent with the sword as a sign of the Final Hour so that none would be worshipped save God, alone, with no partner. My sustenance has been placed under the shadow of my spear. Lowliness and humiliation will come to those who disobey my teachings. Whoever imitates people is one of them." Ahmad narrates this *hadith* in his *Musnad* [Vol. 2, p.50] on the authority of Ibn Umar, and Bukhari cites it.' However, the *Hadith* has a weak chain of narrators.

⁴ Narrated by Bukhari in *Kitab al-Tawhid*, no. 7422, and by Muslim in *Kitab al-Tawbah*, no. 2751.